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he Domain Name System (DNS) is a critical part of the 
Internet infrastructure. Virtually every Internet appli-
cation depends on some form of DNS data, yet access to 
and the reliability of that data aren’t assured. DNS attacks 
and abuses, meanwhile, are increasingly common and
sophisticated. Part of the problem 
is that security wasn’t a major goal 
of the original DNS design. The 
DNS community has been aware 
of security issues for decades, but 
only now are solutions ready for 
wide-scale deployment.  Motivated 
by both its importance and recent 
enhancements to strengthen its se-
curity, this issue of IEEE Security 
& Privacy looks at the challenges in 
securing the DNS.
Security Aspects  
of Today’s DNS
The DNS maps host names such as 
www.computer.org to IP addresses 
and provides a wide range of other 
mapping services, from email to 
geographic location. In its most 
basic form, a DNS attack can pre-
vent an application from receiving 
critical DNS data or redirect the 
application to a bogus server by 
providing false data. For example, 
a Web browser will be unable to 
load the www.computer.org Web 
site if DNS fails to respond to a 
request for the site’s IP address. If 
DNS responds but with the wrong 
IP address, the browser will con-
tact the wrong server and load 
phony Web pages. Even if the user 
recognizes that the loaded pages 
are fake, he or she generally can’t 
reach the valid site unless DNS 
provides a legitimate IP address. In 
this sense, the DNS is truly criti-
cal Internet infrastructure, and we 
must understand its security vul-
nerabilities and potential solutions.
The article “Protecting the 
DNS from Routing Attacks: Two 
Alternative Anycast Implementa-
tions,” by Ioannis Avramopoulos 
and Martin Suchara, addresses the 
challenge of reaching legitimate 
DNS servers in the first place. To 
obtain the IP address of www.
computer.org, the application 
must communicate with serv-
ers, but by disrupting the routes 
to them, a DNS attack can deny 
service or redirect queries to false 
servers that provide forged DNS 
data. This article shows how to ap-
ply different anycast routing tech-
niques to ensure that critical DNS 
servers remain available.
Legitimate network adminis-
trators work to ensure that DNS 
data is available for their sites, but 
spam and phishing campaign orga-
nizers also want to guarantee that 
their sites remain available. The ar-
ticle “Phishing  Infrastructure Flux-
es All the Way,” 
by D. Kevin 
 M c G r a t h , 
 Andrew Kala-
fut, and Minaxi 
Gupta, exam-
ines how attack-
ers are abusing 
the DNS to en-
sure the availability of fake sites and 
make it more difficult to shut them 
down. Using a technique called 
“fast flux,” a DNS name resolves 
to a large number of IP addresses, 
which typically have short validi-
ties and change frequently, mak-
ing it difficult to track them down 
and end the phishing campaign. 
The article describes the fast-flux 
behavior in more detail along with 
variations such as DNS flux and 
double flux. The authors consider 
techniques for detecting vari-
ous flux events and provide both 
an understanding of the fast-flux 
problem and a potentially powerful 
tool for detecting it.
The DNS Security 
Extensions
Protecting routes to servers im-
proves the DNS’s availability, 
whereas addressing problems such 
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as fast flux limits its misuse. These security enhance-
ments are clearly important, but fundamental prob-
lems remain. An attacker with sufficient capabilities 
can provide false DNS data that denies legitimate ser-
vice or redirects traffic to false sites. This basic vul-
nerability has been well known since the early ’90s, 
when Steve Bellovin circulated a paper—“Using the 
Domain Name System for System Break-Ins”—and 
several years later presented it at the Fifth Usenix 
Security Symposium.1 Concerns over the ability to 
spoof DNS responses and poison DNS caches remain 
today. A little more than a year ago, Dan Kaminsky 
identified an exploit that lets attackers effectively poi-
son DNS caches with false results and demonstrated 
this attack’s devastating impact at Black Hat 2008. 
Patches were released for most DNS software to help 
mitigate the vulnerability, but the race between at-
tack strategies and defenses continues. 
To address the vulnerabilities Bellovin and oth-
ers have discovered, the DNS community developed 
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC), which adds 
data origin authentication and data integrity to the 
DNS. Roughly speaking, DNSSEC uses digital sig-
natures to provide cryptographic assurance that IP ad-
dresses reported for a name such as www.computer.
org were entered by the owner of the computer.org 
zone. With DNSSEC deployed, attackers can’t pro-
vide DNS data for the site unless they’ve gained access 
to a private key belonging to the zone or its ances-
tors in the DNS hierarchy. After many years of devel-
opment, DNSSEC was published in March 2005 as 
RFCs 4033, 4034, and 4035.2–4 The focus has since 
shifted from DNSSEC design to deployment. 
As of today, DNSSEC deployment is still in its 
infancy, with only a tiny fraction of zones having 
deployed it, but it has reached important milestones. 
Several DNS server and resolver implementations 
support DNSSEC, and there are both open source 
tools for administering it in most any size zone and 
commercial appliances that automate its deployment. 
Several country code top-level domains, including se 
(Sweden) and bg (Bulgaria), have deployed DNSSEC 
for a few years now. The US government has man-
dated deployment in the gov domain—the gov zone 
itself is already signed, and a growing set of *.gov 
zones are deploying DNSSEC. The generic top-lev-
el domain org has deployed DNSSEC, and the de-
ployment list is growing. You can find operational 
guidelines, best practices, and updated information 
on current deployment at sites such as the DNSSEC 
Deployment Initiative (www.dnssec-deployment.
org), the DNSSEC Industry Coalition (http://dns 
seccoalition.org/website/), the SecSpider DNSSEC 
Monitoring Site (http://secspider.cs.ucla.edu), and 
the NLnet Labs DNSSEC page (www.nlnetlabs.nl/
projects/dnssec/).
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This issue provides three articles that cover dif-
ferent aspects of DNSSEC. The combined result 
discusses how zone administrators can deploy it at au-
thoritative servers, how DNS resolvers can use DNS-
SEC signatures to authenticate data, and open issues 
on managing public keys.
“Open Issues in Secure DNS Deployment,” by 
Ramaswamy Chandramouli and Scott Rose, con-
siders DNSSEC from a zone administrator’s stand-
point. The authors provide a solid overview of both 
the basic DNSSEC design and DNSSEC deployment 
issues. With DNSSEC, a zone operator will gener-
ate a public-private key pair and use the private key 
to sign zone data. This article discusses deployment 
challenges ranging from the selection of appropri-
ate key sizes and rolling over keys to managing au-
thentication chains that let resolvers learn the public 
keys. It’s essential reading for anyone who wants to 
understand how zone operators should deploy and 
manage DNSSEC.
Wouter C.A. Wijngaards and Benno J. Overeinder 
also consider DNSSEC in their article, “Securing 
DNS: Extending DNS Servers with a DNSSEC Vali-
dator,” but from the perspective of a DNS resolver 
trying to validate the DNSSEC signatures zone op-
erators provide. The authors have carefully considered 
the trade-offs in building a resolver that offers both 
security and performance and present a publicly avail-
able resolver that meets their design objectives. They 
further analyze their resolver’s performance, provid-
ing insights on both the advantages and costs in de-
ploying a DNS validator.
Having discussed how authoritative servers sign 
DNS data and how resolvers validate it, we finally 
turn to a challenging problem that faces any system 
that relies on public-key cryptography: How do we 
learn and manage public keys? A zone owner can cre-
ate public keys, and resolvers that have learned them 
can validate data from the zones, but it would be 
impractical to distribute public keys from all secure 
zones to all validating resolvers. In an ideal world, 
DNSSEC would be fully deployed, we could config-
ure resolvers with a single public key of the root zone, 
and each zone would coordinate with its secure par-
ent so resolvers could follow an authentication chain 
from the root public key to the desired DNS record. 
For example, a resolver could use the root public key 
to authenticate the org public key, which could au-
thenticate the computer.org public key, which in turn 
could authenticate the IP address (or, more precisely, 
the DNS type A record set) for www.computer.org. 
In reality, security extensions are incrementally de-
ployed, and full deployment at every DNS zone might 
never occur. The article “Interadministrative Chal-
lenges in Managing DNSKEYs,” by Eric Osterweil 
and Lixia Zhang, considers the problem of managing 
these public keys both when an authentication chain 
can be formed with a secure parent and when no 
 secure parent exists.
W e believe this special issue provides an interest-ing and important look at the DNS, a system 
that almost everyone relies on but is often overlooked 
when assessing overall security. The article on pro-
tecting routes to the DNS servers illustrates some of 
the complexities and interactions between Internet in-
frastructure components, whereas the one on fast flux 
and phishing demonstrates how attackers can misuse 
the seemingly simple DNS system in complex ways. 
Enhancing security in these areas is complementary to 
the DNSSEC objective of adding origin authentica-
tion and data integrity, which the remaining articles 
examine. We hope this issue helps readers understand 
the security challenges facing the DNS and the efforts 
under way to enhance DNS security. 
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